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THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:
WHAT DOES IT REALLY DO?
JOHN G. DAY1
***
“We have to pass the health care bill so you can find out what’s in it,”
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, March 10, 2010 on the floor of the House
of Representatives urging her colleagues to pass the ACA.
***
INTRODUCTION
We are now well into full implementation of the Affordable Care
Act and, despite some distinct improvements, the nation is learning to live
with reduced expectations about the benefits of that legislation. The
exchanges’ initial rollout was chaotic,2 deductibles and co-pays are high on
the cheaper individual plans sold on the exchanges,3 insurers on the
exchanges are seeking rate hikes,4 and important state participation has not
emerged as anticipated. As of March 2016, only 31 states plus the District
of Columbia were participating in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion program
1

Professor in Residence, University of Connecticut School of Law, 19992014; former Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Virginia and
Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel at CIGNA for the pension, healthcare and
investment divisions. Updates and edits to this article were made by Patricia A.
McCoy at Boston College Law School.
2
See
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
GAO-15-238,
HEALTHCARE.GOV: CMS HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS, BUT NEEDS
TO
FURTHER
IMPLEMENT
SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT
(2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668834.pdf.
3
See Robert Pear et al., Cost of Coverage Under Affordable Care Act to
Increase in 2015, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/
15/us/politics/cost-of-coverage-under-affordable-care-act-to-increase-in2015.html?_r=0. See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-312,
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: EARLY EVIDENCE FINDS PREMIUM TAX CREDIT
LIKELY CONTRIBUTED TO EXPANDED COVERAGE, BUT SOME LACK ACCESS TO
AFFORDABLE PLANS (2015).
4
See Margot Sanger-Katz, Get Ready for Higher Obamacare
Rates Next Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/
upshot/get-ready-for-higher-obamacare-rates-next-year.html?_r=0.
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while 19 states were not.5 In 2016, only 12 states and the District of
Columbia had their own exchanges; fully 27 states participated in the
federal exchange.6 Meanwhile, the White House delayed the effective date
of the ACA’s employer mandates following business community
resistance.7 Many continue to resent the individual mandate8 despite the
Supreme Court’s decision upholding that mandate in 2012.9
Opponents have grown more shrill and much of the rhetoric,
including over 50 “ceremonial” repeals of the ACA in the House as of June
2015,10 were geared towards making ACA's implementation shortfalls and
misunderstandings of what the ACA does into a 2016 presidential
campaign issue. Not only do many legislators not know or even care what
5

See STATUS OF STATE ACTION ON THE MEDICAID EXPANSION DECISION,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/stateactivity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/.
6
See STATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE TYPES, 2016, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurancemarketplace-types/. Four more states have federally supported marketplaces and 7
states have state partnership marketplaces. Id.
7
See EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2015), http://kff.org/infographic/employer-responsibilityunder-the-affordable-care-act/. Strictly speaking, the ACA does not require
employers to provide their employees with health insurance. However, large
employers must pay penalties to the Internal Revenue Service if they do not
provide affordable health insurance coverage to their workers. The Obama
Administration delayed the original effective date of that employer mandate until
January 1, 2015 for employers with at least 100 employees and until January 1,
2016 for employers with at least 50 to 99 employees. Id.
8
Under the ACA’s individual mandate, individuals who can afford minimum
essential health insurance but decide not to buy it must either qualify for a health
coverage exemption or pay a penalty. The individual mandate went into effect on
January 1, 2014. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2015); HealthCare.gov, The Fee you Pay
if you Don’t Have Health Coverage, https://www.healthcare.gov/feesexemptions/fee-for-not-being-covered/. For discussion of the continued resentment
in some quarters toward the individual mandate, see Dante Atkins, King v. Burwell
Unpopular, but Anti-ACA Propaganda Having Lasting Effects, DAILY KOS (Apr.
12, 2015), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/04/12/1376255/-King-v-Burwellunpopular-but-anti-ACA-propaganda-having-lasting-effects.
9
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
10
See, e.g., Manu Raju & Burgess Everett, GOP lawmakers: Time to move on
from Obamacare repeal, POLITICO (June 25, 2015, 6:57 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/gop-lawmakers-time-to-move-on-fromobamacare-repeal-119439.
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is in the ACA, much of the public does not understand their options and
fears the ACA's potential impact on their choice of care and how it will be
paid for.11
To date, most of the commentary and anxiety has centered over the
ACA's access provisions and the mandate. Yet there is much more in the
ACA that has been largely ignored.
Most believe the ACA was designed only to provide quality
healthcare to all Americans through a pluralistic public and private system:
private individual and small-employer-sponsored insurance, employerprovided insurance, and several government programs. The private or
market component would be realized through centralized insurance
marketplaces (known as exchanges), both for individuals and small
employers (with less than 50 workers), and eventually through larger
employers. The government component would be provided primarily
through Medicaid and Medicare.
The ACA sets into motion a number of dynamics that will build
upon a number of social and economic forces discussed in Section I and
that will eventually realize its goal of universal coverage, but not in the
way most anticipated it would do when the legislation was passed in 2010.
Instead of a pluralistic public and private system, the final coverage vehicle
will eventually become a single government program for everyone
administered by private entities that only process enrollment, collect
premiums and pay claims – very much like Medicare today. This will
occur because the ACA will create an environment where both individual
and institutional providers, employers, the general public and the states will
become natural allies for a universal health care system much like
Medicare. This surprising coalition will overwhelm the “free enterprise”
advocates and force Congress to embrace a single payer “not-for-profit”
system. The ACA and the emerging social and economic forces propelling
it will produce this result in a very chaotic and untidy chain of events over
the next decade.
In addition, the ACA will do much more than just expand access to
coverage. Over time the ACA will transform not only how one pays for
care, but how care is delivered. The ACA will transform today's medical
professional paradigm from a fee-for-service entrepreneurial “sickness”
11

See, e.g., KAISER HEALTH POLICY TRACKING POLL: THE PUBLIC’S VIEWS ON
ACA, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2016), http://kff.org/interactive/kaiser-healthtracking-poll-the-publics-views-on-the-aca/#?response=Favorable--Unfavorable&
aRange=twoYear (last viewed July 10, 2016).
THE
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model into a not-for-profit “wellness model” where the medical profession
will regain much of the clinical autonomy it lost over the last 30 years.
Many also believe that the ACA will result in better quality healthcare at
lower cost largely because of concepts that permeate the ACA: value rather
than volume purchasing and in particular comparative effectiveness
research (CER).12 This cost reduction may happen, but the experience in
other countries makes this outcome indeterminate.
What is more certain is that the ACA will result in a more efficient
health care system, where decisions in clinical evaluations will balance the
incremental benefits of any treatment with its incremental cost and the
efficacy of new interventions compared to existing ones. Such a
comparison should result in better health outcomes and resource allocation
than we have today, viewed from a population perspective. This increased
efficiency may even result in a higher rather than a lower or a flatter cost
curve relative to gross domestic product because of the transaction costs of
moving the system towards “evidence-based medicine” and clinical
decision-making that takes into account the marginal cost and benefit of
any treatment. Once these initial costs are absorbed, the desired cost impact
may be realized.
This Article is divided into four parts.
Section I will start with a brief description of the major social,
economic, demographic, technological and political trends within which
the ACA will be implemented and evolve over the next decade. This
context is essential to understanding how the various ACA provisions will
change or influence the direction of major components of the health care
system and where things could go wrong. This context is also essential for
making reasonable estimates of the political forces affected by the ACA
and vice-versa and, therefore, what the U.S. healthcare system will look
like in 2025.
Section II will describe how the ACA's provisions attempt to
realize a pluralistic private/government access solution and how these
efforts will set the stage for eliminating the private institutional sector from
financial “risk taking,” diminish private insurers’ role in the delivery of
care and hasten the exit of employers from their traditional role of
sponsoring coverage.
One of the more significant unintended consequences of the ACA
will be public dissatisfaction and jaundice regarding the private sector’s
ability to finance and deliver healthcare better than the government. At the
12

See infra Section III.
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same time, the high cost for some of mandatory health insurance, rising
deductibles and co-pays, and polarization of politics on the state and
federal level will increase the public's distrust of government. Yet there are
segments within the private sector where public opinion of the ACA is
quite favorable and one of those areas involves clinicians delivering
medical care. The ACA’s structural changes will enhance rather than
diminish the role and independence of clinicians regarding medical
decisions.
Section III will examine several parts of the ACA that have not
received much public attention. These include value-based purchasing,
comparative effectiveness research, and several related ACA provisions
which will dramatically change how new medical technology and new and
existing practices are evaluated and delivered.
CER and these structural changes will reinforce the shift from
today's entrepreneurial “for-profit” paradigm to a "not-for-profit”
professional paradigm. That, in turn, will change how society and the
medical profession view how much autonomy and regulation is proper
regarding clinical medical decision-making and how providers should be
compensated for such care.
The Article concludes with a prediction of the future evolution of
the health care system under several possible scenarios based on different
changes in control of the Congress and the White House, as well as other
changes in the political landscape.
Interestingly enough, all of the scenarios, when viewed in the
changing social and economic environment discussed in Section I, lead
towards a common destination: a single government health care system for
all that will resemble Medicare in structure and administration.
I. THE CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, TECHNOLOGICAL
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT OF THE ACA
There are a number of societal changes underway that help explain
the structure of the ACA, the challenges it must overcome and the
importance of its dominating philosophies: value-based purchasing and
comparative effectiveness research. These societal trends, while different,
are very much interrelated and affect one another.
First and foremost, everyone, irrespective of his or her ideological
or political bent or economic status, wants the employer out of the middle
of the U.S. healthcare finance system. Market-oriented individuals would
replace the employer sponsor with the individual worker via co-pays or a
voucher-type system. The left would substitute government for the
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employer. Employers, both large and small, just want out.13 Employers
would still be involved via specific or general taxes or possibly some
defined contribution type of benefit, but their present role as sponsors of
health insurance coverage would be greatly diminished.
Another important influence is that the ACA favors network care
control by the medical profession. The ACA does this in a number of ways,
but primarily through its endorsement of a new type of network for
Medicare called an “Accountable Healthcare Organization” or ACO. The
ACO is a clinician-controlled network based on primary care physicians,
electronic health records and collaboration between primary care
physicians and ancillary and specialist providers participating in the
network. The ACO mechanism seeks to make health care providers more
accountable for healthcare savings and improved health outcomes through
financial carrot and sticks. While originally limited to Medicare, the ACO
concept is rapidly spreading throughout other government programs, such
as Medicaid, and the private delivery system.14
Of equal importance is the fact that the ACA’s exchange
regulations do not create a favorable environment for a for-profit (public
company) insurer. For example, every exchange must have more than one
insurer and one of these must be a “not-for-profit” entity.15 In addition, the
ACA requires insurance participants to offer generous coverage (known as
“essential health benefits”)16 with virtually no underwriting,17 meet
13

For some very preliminary estimates of the extent to which the availability
of individual insurance on the exchanges encourages employers to refrain from
sponsoring health coverage, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12768, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: ESTIMATE OF THE
EFFECT ON THE PREVALENCE OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH COVERAGE
(2012).
14
See Atul Gawande, Overkill, THE NEW YORKER (May 22, 2015) at 53;
Tricia McGinnis, A Unicorn Realized? Promising Medicaid ACO Programs
Really Exist, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (March 11, 2015),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2015/mar/unicorn-realizedmedicaid-acos (“hundreds of ACOs [are] now sprouting up in an array of shapes
and sizes in Medicare, Medicaid, and the commercial sector”).
15
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
10104(q), 124 Stat. 902 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18054(a)(1), (a)(3)).
16
Id. § 10104(b), 124 Stat. 896 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(a)-(b)).
“Essential health benefits must include items and services within at least the
following 10 categories: ambulatory patient services; emergency services;
hospitalization; maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance use
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required loss ratios (i.e., returning between 80% and 85% of premiums
collected in the form of insurance benefits),18 and operate subject to rate
regulation19 and traditional insurance solvency regulation20 that stresses
adequate capital.
Competing dynamics inherent in a mixed free market operating
under a public utility regulatory structure will force traditional insurance
companies to either abstain from participating in many exchanges (many
have already) or be selective about where they will participate (a form of
underwriting).21 These dynamics will force these companies to move even
more quickly than they are today towards the administration of premium
and claims management rather than assuming risk. Already traditional
insurance companies are desperately looking for new missions, such as
“case management,” much like the March of Dimes looked for a new
disease after tuberculosis was conquered.
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; prescription drugs;
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; laboratory services; preventive
and wellness services and chronic disease management; and pediatric services,
including oral and vision care.” Essential Health Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-health-benefits/
(2015). Minimum essential coverage does not include specialized coverage, such
as coverage only for vision care or dental care or workers’ compensation or
disability policies. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124
Stat. 244 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(3)); see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg91(c).
17
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1201(2)(A), (4), 124 Stat.
154–55 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg(a), 300gg-3(a)).
18
See, e.g., id. § 9016, 124 Stat. 872 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §
833(c)(5)).
19
See, e.g., Ann Mills et al., Truth and Consequences – Insurance Premium
Rate Regulation and the ACA, 363 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 899, 899-900 (2010).
20
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1322(c)(5), 124
Stat. 190 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(5)).
21
See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Agustin Armendariz, In Colorado, Disparity in
Health Plan Prices Underscores Ambitions, and Limits, of Affordable Care Act,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/business/in-year2-of-affordable-care-act-premiums-diverge-widely.html?_r=0;
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-657, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT: LARGEST ISSUERS OF HEALTH COVERAGE PARTICIPATED IN MOST
EXCHANGES, AND NUMBER OF PLANS AVAILABLE VARIED (2014) (Insurers who
pick and choose the geographic areas in which they choose to underwrite often do
so to avoid areas with higher proportions of costly high-risk patients.).
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One of the more important societal changes over the last 50 years
is information technology (IT). IT has transformed virtually every aspect
of our lives. Medicine is no exception. As hardware capabilities and
processer capacity have grown geometrically, huge datasets have been
created that can be updated in real time from many diverse government and
private entities.
Just Google and peruse the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care,22
which compiles data on virtually every aspect of medicine – – not only
with respect to practice variations, but also outcomes of alternative
treatments. The Dartmouth Atlas is just one of many ongoing analyses
taking advantage of this technology. Vast data sets can now be
manipulated in an almost infinite number of ways, even down to the zip
code level. This new capability will enable government and other
healthcare entities to analyze new delivery and financing structures and
clinical interventions in terms of outcomes and cost efficiency.
This IT capability makes CER not just a theory but a reality. The
ACA also stresses substituting traditional medical charting with electronic
records, which will enhance the coordination and continuity of care.23 Last
but not least, the new IT capabilities will facilitate the movement away
from fee-for-service reimbursement to bundled payments,24 which will
enable enhanced coordination and continuity of care and network
accountability.
Another critical dynamic is the significant distrust the public has
for many public and private institutions, which influences their comfort
22

DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (last
viewed June 28, 2015).
23
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1104(b)(2)(C),
3002(d), 124 Stat. 147, 365 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(i)(4)(B),
1395w-4(m)(7)).
24
Under a bundled payment system, a payer such as Medicare makes one
payment for services rendered by two or more providers during a one episode of
care or a specified time period. See, e.g., Bundled Payments, AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASS’N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/state-advocacy-arc/stateadvocacy-campaigns/private-payer-reform/state-based-payment-reform/evaluatingpayment-options/bundled-payments.page (last viewed July 6, 2015). Bundled
payments essentially place the risk of the cost of medical services for a particular
episode on healthcare providers. See Suzanne Delbanco, The Payment Reform
Landscape: Bundled Payment, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (July 2, 2014),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/02/the-payment-reform-landscape-bundledpayment/.
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level regarding with whom, if anyone, they will share their decision making
power – – especially on a sensitive subject like healthcare. Government is
one of the least trusted, while the medical profession is the most trusted.
This disparity is clearly reflected in the ACA's provisions regarding the
implementation of CER process, with its focus on voluntary adoption of
best treatment options, transparency and related measures.25
The ACA’s task is a formidable one, fundamentally changing over
one-seventh of the U.S. economy.26 Many things will go wrong, especially
during the early stages, which will only enhance the public's
disenchantment with the private sector's ability and to a lesser degree the
government's ability to solve the problem of access and affordability.
Another important trend relates to the median wage in the United
States. For a variety of reasons, the median wage has remained relatively
stagnant since the 1970s27 and wealth inequality has increased dramatically
over that same period.28 At the same time, the cost of medical care grew
faster than GDP through 2009 in the United States.29 This combination of
25

See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1552, 124 Stat. 258
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)).
26
See CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURE DATA: HISTORICAL, http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Dataand-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (last
viewed June 28, 2015) (In 2013, healthcare expenditures accounted for 17.4% of
the U.S. gross domestic product.).
27
See, e.g., Drew DeSilver, For Most Workers, Real Wages Have Barely
Budged for Decades, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/09/for-most-workers-real-wageshave-barely-budged-for-decades/.
28
See, e.g., Nine Charts About Wealth Inequality in the United States, URBAN
INST. (Feb. 2009), http://datatools.urban.org/Features/wealth-inequality-charts/.
29
See Veronique de Rugy, U.S. Healthcare Spending More Than Twice the
Average for Development Countries, MERCATUS C ENTER —GEORGE M ASON
UNIVERSITY (Sept. 17, 2013), http://mercatus.org/publication/us-health-carespending-more-twice-average-developed-countries. From 2010 through 2013,
healthcare expenditures in the U.S. grew at approximately the same rate as GDP.
CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES
2013 H IGH LIGHTS , http://www.cms.gov/Research -Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/
highlights.pdf. In 2014, healthcare expenditures once again surpassed GDP. CTRS.
FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2014
HIGHLIGHTS, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
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forces increased the ranks of the uninsured. The ACA’s expansion of
Medicaid to 133% of the federal poverty level30 and its use of tax credits
and subsidies for coverage purchased through the exchanges31 attempt to
ameliorate the impact of the growing unaffordable cost of health care. The
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision upholding the payment of subsidies in
states with federal exchanges32 removed the legal doubt surrounding the
continuation of those subsidies in all fifty states.
Then there is our aging population,33 which will only bolster the
number of Medicare recipients over the next several decades. Entitlement
reform, while inevitable, may change eligibility and the generosity of
benefits, but it will not alter the basic structure of a government-run safety
net for the elderly.
Medicare combined with other government programs paid 43% of
the total expenditures on healthcare in 2013.34 Even with entitlement
reform, government monies will dominate the healthcare system.
Accordingly, virtually all providers, both private and institutional, depend
now and will increasingly depend upon government revenues. The entity
that controls the purse strings is also in a position to impose conditions for
receipt of these monies and influence the contours of the system.
Decisions regarding government programs and in particular
Medicare will influence both the private and government health care
system. For example, in 1980, Medicare changed hospital reimbursement
from fee-for-service to a prospective payment system.35 If a hospital

Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf; Paul
Handley, US economic growth in 2014 fastest in four years, AFP (Jan. 30, 2015),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/us -economy-grew-2-6-q4-slower-expected135115848.html?ref=gs.
30
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2001(a)(1), 124
Stat. 271 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)).
31
See, e.g., id. §§ 1401-1421, 124 Stat. 213-242 (2010).
32
King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jul. 27, 2015).
33
See Aging Statistics, ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, http://www.aoa.acl.gov/
Aging_Statistics/index.aspx. (last viewed June 28, 2015).
34
See CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURE DATA: NHE FACT SHEET, http://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE
-Fact-Sheet.html (last viewed June 28, 2015) (computations by editor).
35
See, e.g., RAND CORP., EFFECTS OF MEDICARE’S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
SYSTEM
ON
THE
QUALITY
OF
HOSPITAL
CARE,
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received just one penny of Medicare funds, it was required to charge that
rate to all other Medicare beneficiaries. Shortly thereafter, private payers
began to mimic Medicare's prospective payment approach in one form or
another.36 The same occurred with respect to the reimbursement of
physicians. Today, under the ACA, Medicare hospitals and ACO providers
must also participate in a “shared savings” reimbursement system, which is
accompanied by many practice and quality standards.37
To summarize, the Affordable Care Act was unveiled amidst an
environment where household wages were stagnant, employers wanted to
drop health insurance benefits for their workers, the government sought
lower health costs and better health outcomes, insurers were already
contemplating an exit from underwriting, information technology made it
possible to pinpoint more effective treatments, and people placed their trust
in their doctors, not in insurers or the government. For the reasons that
Section II describes in further detail, the design of the ACA interacts with
these dynamics to create an unstable situation where employers, insurers,
and the public will increasingly reject the ACA’s hybrid private-public
model in favor of a single-payer, government system of health insurance
coverage.
II. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACA'S “BALKANIZED”
APPROACH TO THE UNINSURED: DIRECT GOVERNMENT
COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO COVERAGE VIA THE
PRIVATE SECTOR AND MANDATES
This section describes how the ACA attempts to: 1) extend
coverage to the uninsured; 2) preserve a central role for private sector “forprofit” risk-takers, a.k.a. insurance companies; and 3) maintain and even
expand employers’ historic role as the primary sponsors of health plan
benefits. This section will argue that the ACA will only have partial
success regarding access to affordable care and will have just the opposite

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB4519
-1.pdf.
36
See Cherie Phillips, Private Health Insurance, CASE WESTERN RESERVE
UNIVERSITY, http://www.cwru.edu/med/epidbio/mphp439/Private_
Insurance.htm (last viewed June 28, 2015).
37
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3022, 124 Stat. 395
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj).
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of its intended effect regarding private sector risk-takers and employer
participation.
The ACA takes several different approaches to getting health
insurance coverage to the uninsured. One approach is to expand Medicaid
to more people38 (though the states have to concur in this expansion as a
result of a 2012 Supreme Court decision).39 Another is to require all
insurance plans -- both insured and self-insured -- to contain certain
provisions, such as guaranteed issue, limits on pre-existing conditions,
preventive exams, coverage for dependents up to age 26, and no lifetime
dollar limits.40 Still another is a vehicle for individuals and small groups to
purchase coverage in a government-regulated marketplace called an
insurance exchange41 -- this is a guaranteed access approach to insurance
rather than direct government insurance.
Access to coverage is not the same as providing direct or automatic
coverage. Instead, individuals and small employers have to be eligible for
the coverage and pay for it. When one has access rather than direct
coverage, individuals and groups purchase coverage through private forprofit and not-for-profit insurance companies. Individuals and small
employers are encouraged to exercise this right to access through penalties
for not having minimum coverage42 and means testing what one has to pay
for coverage through tax credits and subsidies.43
These initiatives will not be successful or at a minimum will fall
far short of their intended objectives. In fact, this Article argues that these
well-intentioned initiatives will have two unintended opposite effects: 1)
the development of a broad public consensus that private “for-profit”
enterprises cannot play a constructive role in the financing and delivery of
affordable quality healthcare; and 2) facilitating and incentivizing

38

See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2001(a)(1), 124
Stat. 271 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)).
39
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
40
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1001(5), 1201(2)(A), (4),
10103(a), 10104(b), 124 Stat. 131-32, 154-56, 892, 896 (2010) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg(a), 300gg-1(a), 300gg-2, 300gg-3, 300gg-4, 300gg-11, 300gg-13,
300gg-14, 18022(a)-(b)).
41
Id. § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 173 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)
(2010)); see also King v. Burwell, No. 14-114, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jul. 27, 2015).
42
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
43
See id. §§ 1401–21, 124 Stat. 213–42 (2010).
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employers to reduce rather than expand or maintain their operative role in
the present system.
Before summarizing the details of the ACA's access components
and the challenges the ACA faces in realizing its access objectives, it is
useful to examine the demographics of the uninsured population. The
demographics explain why the ACA has so many different thresholds
regarding and rules for eligibility, mandates, and means-tested ACA tax
incentives.
A.

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE UNINSURED AND THE
DYSFUNCTIONAL “INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP” PRIVATE
INSURANCE MARKET

As of 2010 (when the ACA was enacted), the U.S. had 49.9 million
uninsured individuals, comprising 18.4% of the non-elderly population.44
Numerous uninsured individuals that year did not have coverage because
they were either not working or their employers did not offer coverage.45
In addition, many had low motivation to get coverage either because they
were young and viewed themselves as invulnerable or coverage was
unaffordable in the individual market. Even in the employer-sponsored
market, employer and employee contributions were perceived to be too
high.46 Reduced to essentials, for those individuals, the cost of coverage
44

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE: 2010 - Tables & Figures, fig. 7, tbl. 8, http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/hlthins/data/incpovhlth/2010/tables.html; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES: A SUMMARY OF THE
2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (Sept. 2011), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/
2011/cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml (reporting that the age ranges of the uninsured that
year were as follows: 9.8% were below the age of 18; 29.7% were between 19 and 25
years of age; 28.4% were between 25 and 34 years; and 38.1% were between 35 and 64
years of age. In terms of income, 58.7% earned less than $50,000 a year and 15.4%
earned between $50,000 and $74,999 a year.).
45
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE
UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES: A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY (Sept. 2011), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011
/cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml.
46
See Recent Premium Increases Imposed by Insurers Averaged 20% for
People Who Buy Their Own Health Insurance, Kaiser Survey Finds, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (June 21, 2010), http://kff.org/private-insurance/pressrelease/recent-premium-increases-imposed-by-insurers-averaged-20-for-people-
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exceeded the perceived value of or need for health insurance coverage
relative to other uses of one’s money, particularly for people squeezed by
flat wages and job instability.
For years the individual and small group markets (defined as
employers with less than 50 full-time employees) had been dysfunctional.
The pools in this market were spread among many blocks of individuals
and small employers. As a result the pools available for distributing risk
were much smaller than those available to larger companies or associations
to aggregate risk.47 In addition, the individuals in these markets were not as
healthy as those in the larger group market because of poverty and related
reasons.48
Affordability was exacerbated in the individual and small group
markets because of the small pools, not only because small pools inhibit
efficient risk distribution but also because of the increased transaction costs
associated with the robust underwriting necessary to minimize adverse
selection in an unhealthy population. Affordability was also hampered by
the inability of insurance companies to realize economies of scale when
setting up and administering many individual and small group policies.49
In addition, individuals and employers pre-ACA were not required
to buy or provide coverage. Those who sought coverage were often turned
down to reduce adverse selection.50 Insurers excluded coverage of prewho-buy-their-own-health-insurance-kaiser-survey-finds/; see also L. Levitt, G.
Claxton & A. Damico, Measuring the Affordability of Employer Health Coverage,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.kff.org/healthcosts/perspective/measuring-the-affordability-of-employer-health-coverage/;
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED IN
THE UNITED STATES: A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
(Sept. 2011), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml.
47
See Lester Feder & Ellen-Marie Whelan, An Unhealthy Individual Health
Insurance Market, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 23, 2008),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2008/12/23/5259/anunhealthy-individual-health-insurance-market/.
48
See Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on Four Key
Groups of Americans, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1714, 1716 (2010).
49
See Bernadette Fernandez, Health Insurance: A Primer, in HEALTH CARE
CRISIS IN AMERICA 84, 90 (Janet B. Prince, ed., 2005).
50
See, e.g., Melissa Majerol et al., The Uninsured: A Primer – Key Facts
About Health Insurance and the Uninsured in America, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Jan. 13, 2015), http://kff.org/report-section/the-uninsured-a-primer-what-washappening-to-insurance-coverage-leading-up-to-the-aca/#endnote_link_136859-8.
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existing conditions for those who did qualify for coverage in the individual
market to further cut down on adverse selection.51 Pre-ACA, insurance
companies could often also decide what to charge.52 “Cherry picking” via
the underwriting process and fear of adverse selection from an abnormally
poor health population exacerbated the distribution process and
incentivized insurance companies to make very conservative actuarial
assumptions.53
As a result of all of these factors, the rates for coverage in the
individual and small group markets were generally higher than they were in
a normal functioning insurance market and the availability of coverage
varied greatly between insurance companies.54
Much of the ACA’s uninsured initiatives attempt to rationalize the
individual and small group market through a number of restrictions on
underwriting, the regulation of insurance rates, and a concept that we will
explore later called “shared responsibility.”
B. THE ACA’S PRIMARY UNINSURED COMPONENTS: THE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, THE MANDATE AND MEDICAID
The part of the ACA that has received the most coverage and
visibility to date is the exchange/mandate concept, which is an effort to
ameliorate adverse selection and to bring more competition into the small
group/individual market and eventually the entire employer-sponsored
market. It is also an effort to make private insurance companies an integral
part of the uninsured solution.
Initiatives to make the private health insurance market more
competitive have been around in various forms for some time. Previous
labels include the “managed competition” that surfaced in the 1980s and
was similar to the health insurance purchasing cooperatives in the Clinton
Administration plan in the 1990s.
The exchange/mandate concept embraced by the ACA is the latest
example of these initiatives. Some believe that competition in healthcare
finance via exchanges and mandates coupled with tax subsidies will enable
consumers to choose the best coverage for themselves and assure better
51

See Feder & Whelan, supra note 47.
Id.
53
Id.
54
See, e.g., id.; see also Majerol et al., supra note 50; Newhouse, supra note
48, at 1716.
52
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service than direct government coverage. Many also embrace the exchange
concept because of its appeal to the right or middle right of the political
spectrum. They believe that private insurers in a free market will result in a
more efficient health care system than a system run by the government. Not
surprisingly, the mandate/exchange concept was pushed forward in the
1980s by the Heritage Foundation -- a conservative think tank -- as being
more in line with our economic market system.55 Ironically, it was the
Heritage Foundation that decided in 2011 to argue that the mandate was
unconstitutional.56
1. The Insurance Exchange and Essential Health Benefits
During the debates leading up to the passage of the ACA, many
strongly believed that Americans should have the choice of a public health
insurance option operating alongside private plans. They believed that
having a public option would give them a better range of choices, make the
health care market more competitive, and “keep insurance companies
honest.” However, the public health insurance option was ultimately
dropped from the reform legislation; the insurance sold on the health
insurance exchanges in the United States will, therefore, now be
exclusively from the private insurers.57 Off of the exchanges, Medicare and
Medicaid will continue to serve the elderly and the poor. Thus, the ACA
rejected a single-payer, social insurance model in favor of a hybrid
approach based on a combination of private and government financing and
guaranteed access to health coverage.
Under this hybrid approach, the ACA requires each state (and in
the absence of states doing so, the federal government) to establish an
“insurance exchange” -- that is, a government-run, easily accessible, and
consumer-friendly market bazaar, where private insurance companies
certified by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services offer
55

See Avik Roy, How the Heritage Foundation, a Conservative Think Tank,
Promoted the Individual Mandate, F ORBES (Oct. 20, 2011, 8:26 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/apothecary/2011/10/20/how-a-conservative-thinktank-invented-the-individual-mandate.
56
See Robert E. Moffitt, Individual Mandate Unconstitutional, Unenforceable,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (March 23, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/
commentary/2011/03/individual-mandate-unconstitutional-unenforceable.
57
See Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the
Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1117, 1117 (2010).
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plans.58 Individuals can buy health insurance on the exchange and so can
small employers, which are entitled to a tax credit of up to 50% of the
exchange premium depending on the number of employees and the average
salary.59 To discourage oligopoly pricing, each exchange must have two or
more insurers and at least one must be a “not-for-profit” entity.60 As this
latter provision suggests, one of the main purposes of the exchanges is to
increase price competition among insurers. Another is to assemble larger
pools in order to reduce adverse selection and promote economies of scale.
Another way the ACA seeks to increase price competition and
coverage is through standardization of benefits. The certified insurance
plans participating in an exchange must offer a number of standard health
insurance policies with varying co-pays and deductibles and prices that
reflect the cost and overhead of providing these coverages.61 The ACA
labels the standard content of each policy “essential health benefits.”62 The
ACA’s requirement for standard coverages will facilitate price and service
comparisons and with it, ideally, price competition.63 That requirement
58

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311(b)(1), 124 Stat. 173
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)); see also King v. Burwell, No. 14114, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jul. 27, 2015).
59
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1311(b), (d)(2)(A), 1421(a),
124 Stat. 173, 176, 237 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(b), (d)(2)(A) and
26 U.S.C. § 45R). For tax years 2010 through 2013, the maximum credit was 35%
for small business employers and 25% for small tax-exempt employers such as
charities. An enhanced version of the credit took effect on January 1, 2014. In
general, on January 1, 2014, the rate increased to 50% and 35%, respectively. See
Small Business Health Care Tax Credit Questions and Answers: Calculating the
Credit,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.
(August
11,
2015),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Small-Business-Health-Care-Tax-Credit-Questions-andAnswers:-Calculating-the-Credit.
60
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 10104(q), 124 Stat. 902
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18054(a)(1), (a)(3)).
61
Id. §§ 1301(a)(1), 1302, 124 Stat. 162-63 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
18021(a)(1), 18022).
62
Id. § 10104(b), 124 Stat. 896 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(a)-(b)).
63
To assist in informed comparison-shopping, each exchange must have consumer
advisers (either in the form of “navigators,” “in-person assistance personnel,” or
“certified application counselors”) to help consumers understand the application
process, their eligibility to buy through the exchange, any availability of Medicaid, and
their eligibility for tax credits and subsidies. Id. § 1311(i); see also In-Person
Assistance in the Health Insurance Marketplaces, THE CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. &
INSURANCE
OVERSIGHT,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-
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will also have the important effect of expanding available coverage (both in
the individual market and in employer-sponsored plans).
The ACA also seeks to ensure universal coverage by guaranteeing
access, by eliminating exclusions to coverage, and by making coverage
affordable. Thus, in order to participate in the exchange, an insurance
company plan must be certified as meeting the criteria for a qualified health
plan established by the Department of Health and Human Services,64
namely:
o Guaranteed issue -- Insurers are not permitted to
refuse coverage for any individual or group based on
health status and, in particular, pre-existing
conditions.65
o Restrictions on rescission -- This requirement mirrors
the guaranteed issue requirement in that an insurer
cannot cancel and must renew coverage irrespective
of health status or the experience of the group and in
particular pre-existing conditions.66
o Limits on price variation by class -- Plans must offer a
form of “community rating,” that is, the same rate
irrespective of one's health status, age, etc., with two
exceptions: use of tobacco and a limited price
adjustment for specified age bands. There may be one
community rate for individuals and one for families.67
o Comparable tiers of plans -- Insurance companies
must offer four different versions of the standard
coverages differentiated primarily by the dollar level
of co-pays and deductibles. These coverages are

Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Marketplaces/assistance.html; Gary Cohen, Guidance on
Certified Application Counselor Program for Federally-Facilitated Marketplace
Including State Partnership Marketplaces, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
(July 12, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Downloads/CAC-guidance-7-12-2013.pdf.
64
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1301, 1311(c), 124 Stat.
162, 174 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18021, 18031(c)).
65
Id. §§ 1101, 1201(2)(A), (4), 124 Stat. 141, 154-56 (2010) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 18001, 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4).
66
Id. § 1201(4), 124 Stat. 156 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2).
67
Id. §§ 1101, 1201(4), 124 Stat. 141, 155 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
300gg).
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labeled Bronze, Silver, Gold and Platinum Plans.68
Certified insurers must also offer a catastrophic
coverage for individuals under age 30 or with hardship
exemptions with a deductible equal to the high
deductible plans linked to health savings accounts.69
For 2016, the limits on deductibles under catastrophic
coverage plans were $6,850 per year for individuals.70
No lifetime limits -- Insurers are not permitted to
engage in the traditional practice of setting an annual
or lifetime dollar limits.71
Availability of subsidies and tax credits -- Insurers
must honor subsidies and credits for those whose
annual income is between 138% and 400% of the
federal poverty level to help pay for the purchase of
insurance coverage on an exchange.72

These provisions are intended to produce universal coverage in
three important ways. The guaranteed issue requirement, the limitations on
rescission, and the elimination of lifetime limits ensure that individuals will
not be denied coverage due to health status or dollar caps.73 The provisions
on community rating and tiered plans are both designed to make the menu
options on the exchanges more affordable for certain customers. Finally,
Congress enacted the subsidies and tax credits because many otherwise
would be priced out of health coverage.74
Many of these same provisions, however, shift significant and
some say unmanageable risks onto insurers. Under the ACA, insurers are
deprived of four techniques that they previously used to manage risks and
discourage adverse selection: denial of coverage, coverage exclusions,
lifetime caps, and individual risk-adjusted pricing. In addition, private
insurers on the exchanges face added and unwanted competition, both from
68

Id. § 1302(d), 124 Stat. 167 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)).
Id. § 1302(e), 124 Stat. 168 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(e)).
70
How to pick a health insurance plan, HealthCare.Gov,
https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/plans-categories/ (last viewed July 10,
2016).
71
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1001(5), 124 Stat. 131 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11).
72
Id. § 1401(a), 124 Stat. 215 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36(c)).
73
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
74
Id.
69
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one another and from the not-for-profit insurers that the ACA requires and
in fact encourages through regulation, grants and loans.75 These not-forprofit initiatives focus on the very healthy populations that private insurers
are trying to attract.
The ACA also subjects insurers to added rate regulation to help
keep policies affordable. In addition to federal review, the states will have
the ability to ensure that the policies conform to federal standards and that
rates are supported by verifiable data and subject to the medical loss ratios
(MLR).76 Under the MLR requirement, insurers (both within and outside
the exchange) must provide health benefits equaling 80% of the premium
dollar for individual coverage and 85% for group coverage. States will
review insurance company and self-insured data to verify that MLR
standards have been met and to the degree the benefit requirement has not
been met, the difference will be rebated to the individual or employer.77
States are permitted to disapprove or even set lower health insurance
rates.78 Special review is provided both at the federal and state level for rate
75

The law requires the Comptroller General to establish a 15-member board to
make recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services with regard
to the award of grants and loans to these not-for-profit plans, known as Consumer
Operated and Oriented Plans (CO-OPs). See Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, § 1322, 124 Stat. 187 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18042). The board
appointments were made in 2010. The Center for Consumer Information and
Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) within the Department of Health and Human
Services works with the advisory board to assist and advise the Secretary and
Congress on HHS’s strategy to foster the creation of qualified nonprofit health
insurance issuers. Specifically, the advisory board provides advice regarding the
awarding of grants and loans related to the CO-OP program. In these matters, the
Committee shall consult with all components of the Department, other federal
entities and non-federal organizations, as appropriate. It will also examine relevant
data sources to assess the grant and loan award strategy to provide
recommendations to CCIIO. See id.
76
Id. §§ 1331(b), 9016(a), 124 Stat. 200, 872 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
18051 and 26 U.S.C. § 833).
77
Id. § 1001(5), 124 Stat. 137 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b));
see also Department of Health and Human Servs., Health Insurance Issuers
Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 74864,
74865-66 (Dec. 1, 2010).
78
See, e.g., Mills et al., supra note 19. See generally John Aloysius Cogan Jr.,
Health Insurance Rate Review, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 411 (2016) (arguing that the
ACA’s expansion of the health insurance rate review process could be a more
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increases exceeding 10%.79 States are also required to make sure that
qualified health plans meet state solvency standards,80 such as adequate
reserves, quality reserves, and prudent management practices applicable to
all insurance companies operating the state.
These requirements all collide with the fact that typically, health
insurance providers operate with thin margins.81 The ACA’s MLR and rate
review provisions are likely to cut further into those margins and make
health insurance carriers more hesitant to continue underwriting risk.
The ACA’s new crop of taxes and fees for insurers will only add to
that reluctance.
Under the ACA, the federal government, state
governments, insurers, employers, and individuals have a “shared
responsibility to reform and improve the availability, quality and
affordability of health insurance coverage in the United States.”82 This
“shared responsibility” is achieved in part through taxes and fees on
insurers that not only participate in the exchanges but also those that only
provide health coverage administration outside the exchange.
The fees start with the exchange itself. The ACA provides that a
state with an exchange must “ensure that [its] Exchange is self-sustaining
beginning on January 1, 2015, including allowing the Exchange to charge
assessments or user fees to participating health insurance issuers, or to
otherwise generate funding, to support its operations.”83
effective cost containment tool if updated to address contemporary health
insurance market failures).
79
45 C.F.R. § 154.200.
80
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1322(c)(5), 124
Stat. 190 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18042(c)(5)).
81
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS & THE
CENTER FOR INSURANCE POLICY AND RESEARCH, 2014 HEALTH INSURANCE
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS REPORT, at 1 (2014), http://www.naic.org/documents/topic_
insurance_industry_snapshots_2014_health_ind_report.pdf (last viewed July 1, 2015);
see also Avik Roy, Private Insurer Profits? $13 Billion. Medicare Fraud? $48
Billion.
Health Reform?
Priceless., FORBES, March 4, 2011,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/
2011/03/04/private-insurer-profits-13-billionmedicare-fraud-48-billion-health-reform-priceless/.
82
Internal Revenue Serv., Questions and Answers on the Individual Shared
Responsibility Provision, Question 1, http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-CareAct/Individuals-and-Families/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-Individual-SharedResponsibility-Provision (last viewed June 29, 2015).
83
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311(d)(5)(A), 124 Stat. 178
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(5)(A)).

142

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 22.1

There are still other fees or taxes. For example, the ACA imposes a
Health Insurance Providers Fee on each health insurance company writing
group coverage starting in 2014 equal to $8 billion allocated among each of
the companies based on their national market share. This fee will increase
each year to $14.3 billion by 2018 and will remain in place thereafter
adjusted annually for inflation.84
Another tax is the so-called “Cadillac” tax. Here, health insurers
(and self-funded plans) must pay a 40% tax that applies to workplace plans
on any part of monthly premiums paid by employers that exceed defined
thresholds for single and family coverage.85 Many observers believe the
“Cadillac tax” will provide an incentive to health plans to control the cost
of health insurance and for individuals and employers to purchase less
expensive plans. In 2018, the thresholds will be $10,200 for single
coverage and $27,500 for family coverage.86
These taxes help fund the premium tax subsidies and credits under
the ACA. The taxes are also designed to encourage employers to reduce the
amount of coverage for their employees, which will increase tax revenues
because of the present characterization of healthcare benefits as not being
taxable income. This exemption from the income tax laws was a historical
accident and has been questioned over the years, but repeal of the
exemption never got anywhere because it was politically unpopular. In
recent years, however, repeal has been seriously reconsidered since
reducing the federal deficit has become a top priority.
In sum, this combination of severe underwriting restrictions,
community rating, minimum loss ratios, rate review, required expanded
benefits, mandatory competition from not-for-profit insurers, and taxes,
some of which are designed in part to reduce employee healthcare benefits
sponsored by the employer (even if an employer self-insures and uses a
84

Id. § 9010, 124 Stat. 865 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4001 note prec.);
see Internal Revenue Serv., Affordable Care Act Provision 9010 ---- Health
Insurance Providers Fee, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/AffordableCare-Act-Provision-9010 (last viewed June 29, 2015).
85
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 9001(a), 124 Stat. 847 (2010)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980I). The ACA mandates still other taxes on
pharmaceuticals, medical device manufacturers, and elective cosmetic medical
procedures. Id. §§ 9008, 9009, 9017, 124 Stat. 859, 862, 872 (2010) (codified at
26 U.S.C. §§ 4001 note prec., 5000B).
86
Internal Revenue Serv., Section 4980I — Excise Tax on High Cost
Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage, Notice 2015-16, at 3 (2015).
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health insurance company only as an administrator), create the perfect
storm for a business model based on thin margins and high volume. It is
also a business model that runs a high risk of large losses and the
unpredictability of such losses. Due to these design features of the ACA,
insurers and employers who self-insure will militate more strongly than
ever to exit the provision of health coverage.
2. Shared Responsibility for Individuals and Employers:
The Mandate
The ACA seeks to cure the small pools and adverse selection that
formerly plagued the individual market through a triad of mechanisms. Its
guaranteed issue, no-lifetime-cap, and essential minimum benefit
provisions give access to universal coverage. The subsidies and tax credits
help ensure that access is affordable. Finally, the mandate imposes fines on
individuals and large employers who respectively fail to sign up for, or
provide their workers with, required coverage.87
The individual and employer mandate is a “pay or play” mandate.
While the ACA allows individuals to go without coverage and employers
not to provide coverage, the ACA imposes a penalty on individuals who
choose not to buy minimum essential coverage88 and on employers that
refuse to provide that coverage.89
Acceptable coverage that complies with this mandate includes:90
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

87

Employer‐sponsored coverage (including COBRA
coverage and retiree coverage)
Coverage purchased in the individual market
Medicare coverage (including Medicare Advantage)
Medicaid coverage
Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) coverage
Certain types of veterans’ health coverage
TRICARE (coverage for members of the military and
veterans and their dependents)

See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
89
Id. § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 253 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H).
90
Id. § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)).
88
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In 2014, the individual “shared responsibility” penalty was $95 per person
(or $47.50 per child, capped at $285 per family or 1% of the family’s
yearly income, whichever was greater).91 The penalty increased each year
as follows:
2015: $325 per adult and $162.50 per child under 18
(capped at $975 per family or 2% of the family's income,
whichever was greater).92
2016: $750 per adult and $347 per child (capped at $2000
per family or 2.5% of the family's income, whichever was
greater).93
2017: the same as 2016 adjusted for inflation.94
Accordingly, the penalty will increase each year, but will
be capped at the bronze level exchange premium for the
individual or family.95
Individuals subject to this mandate include children, the elderly,
citizens living abroad and documented foreign nationals living in this
country.96 Although the ACA provides for qualified plans and exchanges
to have mechanisms to deal with unanticipated risks,97 the nature of the
ACA mandate creates fertile ground for adverse selection. The key
question is whether the ACA’s penalties provide enough incentive for
91

Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(B)); see The fee you pay if you
don't have health coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/feesexemptions/fee-for-not-being-covered/ (last viewed June 30, 2015).
92
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(B)); see The fee you pay if you don't have
health coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/fees-exemptions
/fee-for-not-being-covered/ (last viewed July 11, 2015).
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244 (2010)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(A)).
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Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(D)).
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Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)).
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Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)).
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Id. §§ 1341-1343, 124 Stat. 208-213 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
18061-18063); see also Despite Some Delays, CMS Has Made Progress
Implementing Programs to Limit Health Insurer Risk, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-447 (2015).
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people to buy through the exchange or elsewhere. The exchange rates for
New York for 2014, which many characterized as being much lower than
the non-exchange private market, were revealing. The average New York
exchange rate for a single individual on a silver plan was $483 annually
before federal subsidies. That same average rate was $966 for a married
couple and $1377 for family coverage.98 That meant that the average
premium to buy health coverage through the New York exchange was
about 5 times greater than the penalty during the first year.
The ACA also specifies “pay or play” penalties for large employers
that do not provide fully insured or self-insurance coverage for their “fulltime employees.”99 This sharply changes the previous state of affairs
where private employers could decline to provide health coverage to their
employees free from any penalty. First under the ACA, starting in 2015,
large employers had to pay a penalty if they did not offer minimum
essential coverage to at least 95% of their full-time employees (and their
dependents), and at least one full-time employee received a subsidy or tax
credit for purchasing coverage through an exchange. Annually, this
penalty is $2,000 (indexed for future years) for each full-time employee,
excluding the first 30 employees.100 Second, even where large employers
offer minimum essential coverage to at least 95% of their full-time
employees (and their dependents), they must pay a $3,000 penalty for any
98

See Zane Benefits, New York Health Insurance Exchange Update – Plan
Carriers and Rates (July 26, 2013), http://www.zanebenefits.com/blog/bid/306301
/New-York-Health-Insurance-Exchange-Update-Plan-Carriers-and-Rates
(last
viewed July 11, 2015) (analyzing New York State, Approved Monthly Premium
Rates – Individual Standard Plans, http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.
gov/files/archive/assets/documents/Approved2014HealthInsuranceRates.pdf) (last
viewed July 11, 2015) (Computations by Zane Benefits and author).
99
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 253 (2010)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (d)(2)(A)).
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Internal Revenue Serv., Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions,
http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Employers/Employer-SharedResponsibility-Provisions (last viewed Sept. 14, 2015). A “full-time employee” is
defined as one who works at least 30 hours a week. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 253 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §
4980H(d)(4)(A)). Under the transition relief provisions for 2015, the large
employer penalty only applied to employers with at least 100 full-time workers.
The penalty started to apply to all employers with at least 50 full-time workers in
2016. Internal Revenue Serv., Transition Relief, http://www.irs.gov/AffordableCare-Act/Employers/Transition-Relief (last viewed July 1, 2015).
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full-time employee who receives the premium tax credit for purchasing
coverage through the marketplace.101
There is no penalty for small employers (defined as those with
fewer than 50 full-time employees).102 Nor is there a penalty for employers
that have employees making more than 400% of the federal poverty line or
$46,000 per family since those individuals would not be eligible for
exchange subsidies in those states that have expanded Medicaid in
accordance with the ACA. In states that have not expanded Medicaid to the
ACA limits, the threshold would be the threshold amount that the state
requires to qualify for Medicaid.
To recap, the ACA depends heavily on the individual mandate to
reduce the number of uninsured and eliminate adverse selection in the
individual market. Its penalties are too light, however, to drive enough
healthy uninsured people to buy coverage. The same problem affects the
large employer market, where some employers may find it profitable to
treat the penalties as a cost of doing business without providing health
coverage. Other medium-sized employers may lay off workers or reduce
them to part-time work to come under the 50 full-time employee threshold.
Meanwhile, small employers are not subject to a mandate at all.
To the extent that healthy individuals and employers can avoid
coverage – either through payment of a penalty or, in the case of small
employers, none at all – universal coverage will remain elusive and adverse
selection is likely to persist in the individual market. Already, health
insurers on the exchanges are seeking significantly higher rates for 2017
compared to 2016, on grounds that the individuals insured through the
exchanges are much sicker than anticipated.103 While it remains to be seen
whether these insurers’ claims about the extent of adverse selection are
warranted, the weak penalty provisions of the ACA give cause for concern.
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Internal Revenue Serv., Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions,
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C. THE CHALLENGES FACED BY INSURANCE COMPANIES IN THE SMALL
GROUP MARKET

Clearly, the exchange marketplace is not a hospitable place for
private for-profit and maybe not even for not-for-profit insurers. Due to the
guaranteed issue provision, the risk for each insurer is virtually unlimited
(though moderated somewhat by the reinsurance and risk adjustment
mechanisms of the exchange).104 Adverse selection is very real because the
incentive penalties are so much lower than the premium costs of the broad
exchange coverage, even when one considers the federal subsidy. In
addition, there is no assurance that the exchange will attract the
heterogeneous population, especially the younger healthier population,
needed to distribute risk efficiently.
Already many healthy young people have decided to avoid the
exchanges and just pay the penalty, arguing that it's a better deal for them
financially. In addition, lack of public understanding and knowledge of the
existence of the exchange has raised considerable doubt as to whether those
who can benefit most from the exchange will apply. Providers of
healthcare, and in particular hospitals and health insurers, are actively
reaching out to the public because the absence of large pools and people
insured by private companies and Medicaid will hurt their bottom line.
Compounding the problem of adequate heterogeneous pools,
employers and their advisors are actively looking for ways to avoid the
ACA’s requirements. Many employers, even small employers, are
considering self-insuring or obtaining stop loss to protect themselves from
unexpected catastrophic claims.105 Other employers are redefining their
workforces so that they do not meet the full-time employment threshold.106
Viewed in its totality, the future of private insurance in the exchange
104

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1341-1343, 124 Stat. 208213 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18061-18063). For discussion of those
reinsurance and risk adjustment mechanisms, see, e.g., GAO, supra note 97.
105
See, e.g., PlanSponsor, No Rush to Self-Insure Health Benefits Yet, June 17,
2015, http://www.plansponsor.com/No-Rush-to-Self-Insure-Health-Benefits-Yet/
(last viewed July 1, 2015).
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See, e.g., Karen McVeigh, US Employers Slashing Worker Hours
to Avoid Obamacare Insurance Mandate, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 30, 2013,
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ObamaCare
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http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacare-employer-mandate/ (last viewed July 1,
2015).
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context is bleak. Publicly traded private insurance companies remain
cautious about participation in the exchanges, though they are slowly
testing the waters.107 This reluctance will persist, especially for companies
that report quarterly and expect yields competitive with other public stock
companies.
In the ACA, Congress assumed that the private insurance sector
will continue to underwrite health risks for most of the non-elderly
population. But nothing requires private insurers to continue to do so. To
the contrary, the burdensome nature of the ACA’s provisions is likely to
eventually drive private insurers out of the individual health insurance
market altogether. Meanwhile, large employers will chafe under their new
obligation to provide health coverage under pain of penalty and will align
with private insurers to shed their involvement in health insurance. They
will be joined by the numerous individuals who discovered to their dismay
that many of the subsidized plans that are marketed as affordable come
with high deductibles and co-pays. With private insurers heading for the
exits, employers following closely behind, and citizens demanding truly
affordable health insurance with no costly hidden surprises, an odd
coalition of forces will coalesce supporting change to a single-payer,
government health insurance system.
III. THE ACA'S MOST ENDURING LEGACIES: FUNDAMENTAL
RESTRUCTURING OF THE MEDICAL DELIVERY SYSTEM
AND NEW POLITICAL COALITIONS THAT WILL
CULMINATE IN TRUE UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE
During the 20th century, the medical delivery system and thirdparty payers in the United States “grow’d like Topsy” into a sprawling
fragmented universe that more often than not has multiple clinicians
treating non-routine maladies with little or no coordination. Today, this
fragmented system represents over one-seventh of the total U.S. gross
domestic product108 and is composed of many diverse stakeholders, both
with respect to the delivery and payment of care.
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See, e.g., GAO, supra note 21, at 10-11.
CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH
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According to recent statistics, there were over 5,600 U.S. hospitals
(both profit and not-for-profit), almost 900,000 physicians practicing in
many diverse structures in the U.S. (e.g., as sole practitioners, varying
types of group practices, and employees of hospitals and other institutional
providers, including state and local governments), over 800 third-party
payers (a.k.a. insurance companies), and a number of federal and state
government programs -- the latter providing over 40% of total medical
expenditures.109 Other stakeholders include pharmaceutical and medical
service companies and allied professionals, such as nurse practitioners and
chiropractors.
There are many reasons why the rate of rising medical costs
threatens to exceed the growth of GDP, including technology, the volumedriven fee-for-service reimbursement methodology, and a professional and
societal culture that embraces a “more is better” mentality. One of the most
overlooked drivers of medical costs is the transaction cost of dealing with
the large and diverse number of payment and delivery components of our
balkanized health care system. Estimates vary, but most believe that
changing from the current third-payer system to a government-run, singlepayer system could reduce the annual cost of health expenditures in the
U.S. – currently running at $2.7 trillion -- by around 16%.110
Most of the stakeholders in the system make more under the
fragmented volume-based system and therefore have a vested interest in
perpetuating it. This Balkanized system historically deferred to the clinical
decisions of professional clinicians (though this deference diminished
109

Fast Facts on US Hospitals, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS’N,
http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml (last viewed July 1,
2015); CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURE DATA: NHE FACT SHEET, http://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Statistics-trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHEFact-Sheet.html (last viewed June 28, 2015) (computations by editor); Total
Industry Overview, INS. INFORMATION INST., http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/
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KAISER FAMILY FOUND. http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-active-physicians/
(last viewed July 1, 2015).
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See, e.g., Gerald Friedman, Universal Health Care: Can We Afford
Anything Less?, Dollars and Sense (July 1, 2011), http://www.pnhp.org/news/2011
/july/universal-health-care-can-we-afford-anything-less; Elisabeth Rosenthal, The
$2.7 Trillion Medical Bill, N.Y. TIMES, (June 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
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significantly over the last 40 years) and displayed a bias towards evaluating
the efficacy of a particular product or practice considered alone rather than
its effectiveness compared to alternatives. As a result, comparative little
attention was paid to the marginal value of a particular intervention
compared to its marginal cost.
The ACA changes this historic paradigm in several significant
ways and the impact of these ACA changes will be amplified by the
economic and demographic trends summarized in Section I of this Article.
Many of these ACA initiatives will be more significant and enduring than
the much-publicized ACA efforts to cover the uninsured through the
exchanges and mandates.
The enduring ACA initiatives are based on several related
assumptions: 1) the delivery system must be restructured so that every
entity involved in a medical intervention is accountable for its outcome; 2)
accountable clinicians should base their decisions on evidence-based
medicine – in other words, best practices based on real-world clinical
outcomes data and the marginal cost and therapeutic value of any
intervention; 3) increased patient satisfaction and participation in the
intervention process; and 4) changes in payment methodologies that align
clinician reimbursement with the value rather than the volume of such
interventions.
These ACA initiatives are intricately related but can be best
described by breaking them into three basic categories: 1) value-based
purchasing; 2) structural changes to the delivery and financing system; and
3) comparative effectiveness research.
While most of these initiatives focus on Medicare, most believe
commercial and other government payers will soon follow suit in one form
or another for a number of reasons: 1) Medicare is the largest payer for
both institutional and individual providers and these clinicians will
gravitate towards its processes; 2) other government payers, such as
Medicaid and CHIP, will build on the Medicare initiatives; 3) commercial
payers will try and differentiate their value-based purchasing (via branding
and somewhat different approaches) and those providing Medicare
Advantage will build their value-based purchasing efforts on the Advantage
platform. Over time most stakeholders will gradually move towards the
Medicare processes because Medicare will provide a “good housekeeping
seal of approval” for branding purposes and because insurers, in the
process, can reduce the transaction costs otherwise associated with multiple
payment systems.
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A. VALUE-BASED PURCHASING
Reduced to its essentials, value-based purchasing (VBP) is the
restructuring of the historic reimbursement approach for medical care from
one based on volume (i.e., the fee-for-service system) to a more efficient
healthcare system (in which the marginal therapeutic value of any
intervention must exceed its marginal cost) that also pursues other desirable
goals. VBP seeks to accomplish these objectives by linking part of
healthcare reimbursements to quality measures.111
Underlying these objectives is the belief that embracing this
methodology will reduce or flatten the rate of rising healthcare costs while
improving quality. Over the last 100 years, VBP has raised its head here
and there (for example, in the form of the health maintenance organization,
case management, and various other prepayment arrangements), but
generally the U.S. healthcare payment system has been dominated by feefor-service reimbursement.
Starting in the early 2000s, VBP received increasing attention,
especially at the national level. Congress authorized VBP as a pilot project
in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003.112 Pursuant to this legislative initiative, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) began implementing demonstration
programs starting in 2003 that instituted VBP with respect to various
healthcare providers, such as group practice physicians, hospitals, nursing
homes and home healthcare services.
The ACA centralized oversight for these pilot programs under a
new entity located in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
called the “Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation” (CMMI).113 The
ACA will fund the center with $10 million annually for 10 years to
evaluate and identify new payment methodologies that will result in
improved quality and savings.114
111
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Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5001, 120 Stat. 28 (2006).
113
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114
Id. § 3021, 124 Stat. 394 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(f)).

152

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 22.1

These VBP pilot projects were and are being primarily carried out
in a fee-for-service environment. Their main focus is on data collection,
though several do so in the context of programs with real economic
consequences for selected stakeholders, primarily hospitals. Among other
things, the ACA requires HHS to create comparative websites for hospitals,
physicians and other providers providing Medicare services. The initial
websites will provide basic data on each provider and include outcomes
data as those data become available.
Several recent HHS rulemakings regarding hospitals illustrate the
type of programs being developed under the ACA. In 2012 HHS
promulgated a rule designed to reduce acute hospital readmission rates. The
program initially focuses on selected high-cost or high-volume conditions,
such as heart failure and pneumonia. Starting in 2013, hospitals serving
Medicare beneficiaries with high volume conditions, such as chronic heart
failure, surgeries and infections acquired in hospitals, had to meet certain
quality targets and if they did not, CMS would make progressive reductions
in their Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) reimbursement rate.115
In 2013, HHS initiated its hospital VBP program for inpatient stays
in approximately 3000 hospitals across the country. Under this program,
Medicare will adjust the hospital payment based on either: 1) how well the
hospital performs compared to all hospitals in the area; or 2) how much the
hospital’s performance has improved compared to a defined prior
baseline.116
115

Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient
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(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o), (p)).
116
Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Medicare and Medicaid Programs:
Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center

2016

WHAT DOES IT REALLY DO?

153

Physicians are already submitting performance data and the ACA
mandates a similar program for physicians by 2016.117 More and more of
these types of programs will be expanded to other Medicare providers as
time data and methodologies are deemed feasible based on the ongoing
demonstration projects.
CMS has also established data collection activities in Medicaid and
CHIP programs to facilitate the creation of similar projects with
reimbursement repercussions for these payers.118 Pursuant to the ACA,
other demonstration projects are setting targets for skilled nursing facilities
and home health agencies.119 By 2016, targets will be established for
psychiatric hospitals, prospective-payment-system (PPS)-exempt cancer
hospitals, hospice centers, long-term care hospitals, and rehabilitation
hospitals.120
At the same time a number of other HHS and commercial entities
are experimenting with bundled payments for situations where multiple
providers participate in a particular medical intervention.121 The ACA has
taken the bundled approach one step further: the ACO program -- which is
not a demonstration pilot but the creation of a new type of entity that will
be able to contract directly with Medicare and share in any savings the new
entity realizes relative to a predetermined average benchmark
Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs; Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing Program; Organ Procurement Organizations; Quality Improvement
Organizations; Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Program; Provider
Reimbursement Determinations and Appeals – Part III: Final rule with comment
period and final rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 74826 (Dec. 10, 2013) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 405, 410 et al.).
117
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3007, 124 Stat. 373 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(p)).
118
See Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Medicare Program; Hospital
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Hospitals’ Resident Caps for Graduate Medical Education Payment Purposes;
Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers and for Ambulatory
Surgical Centers – Part II: Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 53258, 53503-04 (Aug. 31,
2012) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, et al.).
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3006, 124 Stat. 372 (2010).
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Id. §§ 3004, 3005, 124 Stat. 368, 371 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1395cc, 1395f(i), 1395ww).
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PAYMENTS FOR CARE IMPROVEMENT (BPCI) INITIATIVE: GENERAL INFORMATION,
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-payments/ (last viewed July 6, 2015).
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reimbursement under Medicare's fee-for-service and DRG methodology.122
The ACO program will be discussed in the next section.
B.

MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES
REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM

IN

THE

DELIVERY AND

The ACA contemplates a new type of network of physicians and
hospitals called an accountable care organization whose members agree to
share responsibility for healthcare provided to patients. Under the ACA, an
ACO agrees to manage all of the health care needs of at least 5,000
Medicare beneficiaries for three years or more.123
The ACO structure is voluntary.124 It is designed to facilitate
seamless quality care and to make all of the clinicians involved collectively
accountable for the care each provider provides to an individual patient.
Providers are “rewarded” with bonuses for slowing the growth of Medicare
healthcare costs while meeting performance standards, including patient
satisfaction standards.125
Under the final rule defining the contours of ACOs,126 there are 33
quality standards that focus on four key areas: patient/caregiver experience,
care coordination/patient safety, preventive health, and at-risk populations
(people who are frail or elderly).127
The ACO structure is available to physicians in group practices,
networks of individual physicians, partnerships or joint venture
arrangements among hospitals and participating physicians, hospitals
employing physicians, and other providers and suppliers determined by the
HHS secretary to be eligible for the program.128 Notably, non-clinicians
122
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 3022, 124 Stat. 395
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj).
123
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PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 18, 2011), www.npr.org.
124
See, e.g., Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Summary of Final Rule
Provisions for Accountable Care Organizations under the Medicare Shared Savings
Program (2015), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/
sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACO_Summary_Factsheet_ICN907404.pdf.
125
Id.; Gold, supra note 123.
126
Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Medicare
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule, 76 Fed.
Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011).
127
Id. at 67889-90.
128
Id. at 67808.
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must work through clinicians,129 which will enhance physician autonomy
vis-à-vis third party payers and other non-clinician “partners.”
An ACO must meet certain criteria and be approved by HHS. Key
conditions include: 1) a governing body representing ACO providers and
patients; 2) accepting responsibility for at least 5,000 Medicare fee-forservice beneficiaries; and 3) providing a detailed plan acceptable to the
secretary regarding how the ACO plans to deliver quality and lower the
growth of expenditures, including procedures for routine self-assessment
monitoring and the reporting of care it provides plus a process to use the
data to continually improve the ACO's quality and cost performance.130
This latter provision expects ACOs to be active practitioners of evidencebased medicine.
Once certified, the ACO must participate in the program for at least
three years.131 CMS can terminate the program if the ACO fails to comply
with the eligibility and program requirements.132
While certified ACO structures may vary somewhat, each must
meet the general requirements listed above. Conceptually the foundation of
the ACO will be primary care physicians, responsible for treating groups of
patients linked together with participating specialists, hospitals, and
electronic records systems.
Any certified ACO that meets the plan quality standards will be
eligible to receive a share of the saved earnings relative to a predetermined
and updated benchmark. The final rules also provide that an ACO may
choose a higher shared savings rate if it agrees to share in any losses.133
Contemporaneous with this ACO “shared savings” rulemaking,
CMS’s “innovation center” released a demonstration project for smaller
ACO entities that are physician-owned or located in rural locations to
receive advance payments (of up to $250,000) for investments in
infrastructure and caregiving staff.134 CMS also unveiled a series of
demonstration projects providing for provider remuneration based on
bundled payments for an episode of care -- where all providers involved in
129

Id.
Id. at 67807-08, 67816-30.
131
Id. at 67807, 67977.
132
Id. at 67982-83.
133
Id. at 67909-12.
134
See CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., ADVANCE PAYMENT
ACO
MODEL,
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Advance-Payment-ACOModel/ (last viewed July 6, 2015).
130

156

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 22.1

treating a patient will share in the bundled or single episode payment. 135
Clearly the end goal of “shared savings” is to align provider incentives with
health outcomes – in other words, to create accountability.
Another important Medicare cost containment measure involves
the ACA’s changes to the Independent Medicare Advisory Board
(IMAB).136 IMAB is a 15-member agency137 designed to strengthen the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC). MedPAC’s job for
many years was to make recommendations to achieve specific savings in
Medicare without affecting coverage or quality.138 The old MedPAC had
no power whatsoever because any of its recommendations had to be
approved by Congress.139 Of MedPAC’s many recommendations over the
years, none was approved by Congress.
The new IMAB has roughly the same charge – to make proposals
to Congress to “reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare
spending”140 – but its power is enhanced by its structure. First, each
member is appointed by the president for staggered terms with advice and
consent of the Senate.141 Second, IMAB’s recommendations automatically
go into effect unless Congress adopts an equally effective recommendation
with approval by both houses, including at least three-fifths of the
135
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Senate.142 IMAB’s cost control recommendations for Medicare
consequently have significantly more teeth.
Still other significant changes, such as the shifting of Medicare
funding for residencies in teaching hospitals to community hospitals and
clinics,143 are designed to reinforce the ACA's structural changes essential
to a primary care/CER foundation, including the trend towards evidencebased medicine and advanced continuity and coordination of care.
While there is no “silver bullet” for better individual outcomes,
better healthcare for populations, and lower expenditure growth, there is a
widespread consensus that the best chance for meeting all three goals
requires the alignment of provider treatments with accountability. There is
also widespread consensus on the need for more evidence-based medicine
and particularly the degree to which new procedures and practices provide
better results than existing ones. Realizing evidence-based medicine and
best practices is the ultimate goal of another primary ACA objective:
comparative effectiveness research.
C. COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME
HAS COME

1. What is CER?
Although we have in place a system to test the safety of drugs and
medical devices, the Institute of Medicine estimates that over one half of all
medical procedures have not been subject to rigorous evaluation.144 The
ACA attempts to change this by expanding the evaluation process to
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See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 103, 105 (2010); Newman & Davis, supra note 138, at 51. This
procedure resembles the successful procedure instituted for recommendations on
military base closings in the legislation establishing the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission. Topher Spiro, The Independent Payment Advisory
Board,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS
(March
5,
2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/report/2012/03/05/11269/theindependent-payment-advisory-board/ (last viewed June 16, 2016).
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 5503, 124 Stat. 655 (2010)
(codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h)(8)).
144
Inst. of Med., Best Care at Lower Cost: The Path to Continuously Learning
Health Care in America 150-151 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2012).
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encompass all aspects of health care:145 alternative medical delivery
structures, alternative clinical interventions and alternative drugs and
medical devices. Not all existing practices can be changed at once. Instead,
they will be evaluated in stages in accordance with priorities established by
the Institute of Medicine reinforced by an elaborate structure of clinical
experts and other stakeholders in the system.
There is no uniform definition of CER, but the definition
formulated by the former Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative
Effectiveness Research is often used to describe it. CER, according to the
Council, is:146
[…]the conduct and synthesis of research comparing the
benefits and harms of different interventions and strategies
to prevent, diagnose, treat and monitor health conditions in
“real world” settings. The purpose of this setting is to
improve health outcomes by developing and disseminating
evidence-based information to patients, clinicians, and
other decision-makers, responding to their expressed
needs, about which interventions are most effective for
which patients under specific circumstances.
Even this definition does not capture the true significance of CER, which
can be best described by articulating how the present evaluation process
works and its impact upon the way medical care is delivered and paid for
today.
The traditional evaluation approach or clinical trial measures the
efficacy of a particular treatment: that is whether the treatment produces or
does not produce a marginal benefit in the artificial world of the laboratory
measured against a randomized control group. The American Medical
Association's characterization is revealing:147
145

For the ACA’s provisions on comparative effectiveness research, see the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 3011, 3501, 6301(a)-(c), 124 Stat.
378, 507, 707-42 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 280j, 299b-33, 299b-37, 1320e,
1320e-1).
146
Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 5 (2009) (emphasis added).
147
Advocacy with the Administration: Comparative Effectiveness Research,
AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/federal/advocacywith-administration.page (last viewed July 10, 2016).
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Most current research on medical treatments compares the
benefits of a specific treatment to no treatment, but little
information is available to physicians to help them
determine if new treatments outperform existing options.
The differences between traditional evaluation and CER will have
a profound effect upon the delivery and financial structure of medical care.
More often than not, the traditional clinical trial focuses on comparing the
“efficacy” of a given treatment to no treatment (via a “control group”),
rather than also comparing the new intervention’s cost and outcome to
existing alternative treatments. In addition, this traditional focus more
often than not concentrates on new technology and whether a new
procedure or product is safe “on average,” which dilutes or avoids
ascertaining whether there would be similar or different outcomes for
subpopulations based on age, gender, health status and other relevant
factors.
The traditional evaluation process fits into the prevailing medical
paradigm, i.e., that something new is always better across-the-board. It fits
into the prevailing reimbursement paradigm of fee-for-service -- the more
you do, the more money you make. Both reinforce “for-profit” as opposed
to “not-for-profit” medicine.
Of even greater importance, the traditional evaluation process does
not measure whether the incremental benefit of a new intervention
outweighs its incremental cost. This is a highly relevant indicator, along
with how the new technology’s outcomes compare with existing
alternatives, of the efficiency of the new medical intervention.
CER’s potential for cost-benefit analysis is greatly feared by many
stakeholders in the present system, especially drug and medical device
manufacturers. Another controversial aspect of CER is that its findings of
best practices could be used to mandate a particular treatment under
particular circumstances. Although the American Medical Association
(AMA) has strongly endorsed CER, its focus has been on clinical outcomes
and it is very explicit regarding the use to which CER findings could be put
to use:148
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Principles for Comparative Effectiveness Research, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/federal/advocacy-with-administration.page (last
viewed July 10, 2016) (emphasis added).
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The highest priority should be placed on targeting health
care professionals and their organizations to ensure rapid
dissemination to those who develop diagnostic and
treatment plans.
*****
The CER entity must not have a role in making or
recommending coverage or payment decisions for payers.
*****
Physician discretion in the treatment of individual patients
remains central to the practice of medicine. CER evidence
cannot adequately address the wide array of patients with
their unique clinical characteristics, co-morbidities and
certain genetic characteristics. . . . [S]ufficient information
should be made available on the limitations and exceptions
of CER studies so that physicians who are making
individualized treatment plans will be able to differentiate
patients to whom the study findings apply from those for
whom the study is not representative.
It is noteworthy that while the AMA strongly embraces evidence-based
medicine and comparative effectiveness research, it makes it very clear that
professional autonomy regarding the use of CER findings is of key
importance to clinicians. This theme permeates the ACA. For example,
ACO governance is heavily dominated by clinicians.149 Funds for building
infrastructure emanate from the government for direct distribution to
clinicians,150 which reduce the dependence of clinicians upon non-clinician
“deep pockets” for infrastructure capital. In addition, the ACA's bias

149
Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Medicare
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule, 76 Fed.
Reg. 67802, 67816-22 (Nov. 2, 2011).
150
CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., ADVANCE PAYMENT ACO
MODEL, http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Advance-Payment-ACO-Model/ (last
viewed July 6, 2015).

2016

WHAT DOES IT REALLY DO?

161

towards “not-for-profit delivery systems”151 strengthens the leverage of the
profession regarding clinical decision-making.
Because many in the public equate limits of any kind as
“rationing,” in view of the importance of clinical autonomy for the medical
profession and the concerns of all stakeholders regarding the economic
impact of CER, it is not surprising that a large part of the ACA's CER
provisions deal with how CER is implemented.
2. Implementation of CER
Most agree that CER, if implemented to its full potential, will
transform the medical professional paradigm. 152 Many, however, are
skeptical that CER will realize its potential, primarily for three reasons: 1)
the restrictions the ACA places on the use of CER findings and evidence
for Medicare and to a more limited degree recommendations to Congress
by IMAB;153 2) the inclusion of non-clinician stakeholders in the governing
mechanisms of CER; and 3) the historic reticence of clinicians to abdicate
their autonomy regarding clinical decisions.
To be sure all three present challenges. However, these challenges
are overstated and the way CER implementation is structured not only
ameliorates these concerns by accident or elegant design but actually
creates a structure that is best suited to realize CER's potential for clinicians
and other stakeholders to adopt voluntarily identified and documented best
practices and increased reliance upon evidence-based medicine. The
following will first summarize the governing structure of CER and then
describe how the structure overcomes the major concerns of skeptics.
CER is not a new concept and has been around for some time
although its implementation has been fragmented in the U.S. It first
became centralized with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
151

See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1322, 10104(q),
124 Stat. 187, 903 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18042, 18054(a)(3)).
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See, e.g., John Aloysius Cogan Jr., The Affordable Care Act’s Preventive
Services Mandate: Breaking Down the Barriers to Nationwide Access to
Preventive Services, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 355 (2011) (arguing that the ACA’s
requirement that public and private health plans provide evidence-based preventive
services with no out-of-pocket costs effectively transforms those plans into
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See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 3403(a)(1), 6301(c),
124 Stat. 490, 740 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320e-1(a), (c)(1),
1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii)).
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2009 (ARRA), which appropriated $1.1 billion to fund CER among three
agencies: the Department of Health and Human Services, the NIH and the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRC).154
ARRA also created a public entity, the Federal Coordinating
Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research, to coordinate CER efforts
at the federal level.155 The Institute of Medicine (IOM) also was given the
responsibility to establish national priorities for CER156 and IOM
recommended 100 critically important initial topics for CER research.157
The ACA builds upon these concepts and creates a new not-forprofit corporation that the ACA stresses is “neither an agency nor
establishment of the United States government.”158 The new entity is
named the “Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute” (PCORI),
which replaces its predecessor, the Federal Coordinating Council for
Comparative Effectiveness Research.159
PCORI is directed by a board of governors composed of the heads
of NIH and AHRQ and 17 other members selected by the General
Comptroller. Three board members represent patient and consumer
interests. In addition, there must be five physicians and provider
representatives, including at least one surgeon, nurse, integrative healthcare
practitioner, and hospital representative. Other representatives must
include three private payers, including at least one to represent self-funded
employers. Pharmaceutical, medical device, and diagnostic firms have
three representatives. Finally one board member must be an independent
health service researcher and the two remaining members must represent
state and federal health agencies.160
PCORI’s mission is to advance the “quality and relevance of
evidence” available to patients, physicians, payers, and policymakers.161 Its
154
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit.
VIII, 123 Stat. 177 (2009).
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Id. § 299b-8.
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Id. § 3.
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See Inst. of Med., 100 Initial Priority Topics for Comparative Effectiveness
Research,
http://iom.nationalacademies.org/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2009/
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100%20CER%20Priorities%20-%20for%20web.ashx (last viewed July 7, 2015).
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 6301(a), 124 Stat. 728 (2010)
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responsibilities are to identify research priorities, analyze evidence
identifying the relevance of current evidence and economic effects, and
advance broad dissemination of research findings.162
The ACA specifically directs PCORI to pursue “comparative
clinical effectiveness research,”163 which the ACA describes as head-tohead comparisons of “health care interventions, protocols for treatment,
care management and delivery procedures, medical devices, diagnostic
tools, pharmaceuticals . . . , integrative health practices, and any other
strategies or items being used in the treatment, management, and diagnosis
of, or prevention of illness or injury in, individuals.”164
Part and parcel of PCORI’s efforts is to provide information to
educate patients so that patients will play a more pivotal role in treatment
decisions and their relationship with their physicians.165 Whether or not
PCORI will be able to ameliorate the asymmetry of information between
doctor and patient and the cultural dominance of clinicians in the doctorpatient relationship remains to be seen.
PCORI has considerable human and dollar resources at its
disposal.166 Among other things, it has a nationally recognized Executive
Director and a large staff of experts to evaluate research proposals and
make decisions regarding these proposals.167
Transparency and checks and balances are to be assured by a
requirement that PCORI submit a draft of research priorities for public
comment prior to formal adoption.168 The ACA further limits the use of
PCORI’s conclusions for purposes of Medicare:169
The Secretary may only use evidence and findings from
research conducted under section 1181 to make a
determination regarding coverage under title XVIII
[Medicare] if such use is through an iterative and
transparent process which includes public comment and
considers the effect on subpopulations.
162
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In addition, PCORI is specifically prohibited from adopting “QALY” or
similar thresholds for establishing what types of care are cost-effective.170
Medicare decisions cannot be made “in a manner that treats extending the
life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of lower value
than” an individual who is not.171 Similarly, the Secretary of HHS is
specifically prohibited from adopting a QALY or similar metric for
establishing what types of care are cost-effective.172
These ACA limitations conclude by saying “nothing in . . . [the
ACA should] be construed as superseding or modifying the coverage of
items or services . . . that the Secretary [of HHS] determines are reasonable
and necessary under” existing law:173
(b) Nothing in section 1181 shall be construed as –
(1)
Superseding or modifying the coverage of items
or services under title XVIII that the Secretary
determines are reasonable and necessary under
section 1162(l)(1); or
(2)
authorizing the Secretary to deny coverage of
items or services under such title solely on the
basis of comparative clinical effectiveness
research.
Though these limitations appear severe and far-reaching, they do
not apply to voluntary professional clinical decisions under Title XVIII.
Nor do these limits apply beyond HHS Medicare regulations. The new
IMAB is subject to roughly the same restrictions although the language is
different and appears somewhat narrower in scope:174
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[An IMAB] proposal shall not include any
recommendation to ration health care, raise revenues or
Medicare beneficiary premiums under section 1818,
1818A, or 1839, increase Medicare beneficiary costsharing (including deductibles, coinsurance, and
copayments), or otherwise restrict benefits or modify
eligibility criteria.
Consequently, despite the vagaries of these statutory limitations, it
is clear that Congress preferred that PCORI’s findings and evidence and
IMAB’s recommendations be implemented “voluntarily” by clinicians.
3. Potential obstacles to the implementation of CER
Most skeptics emphasize the ACA’s CER Medicare restrictions as
the main impediment to successful implementation of CER. To be sure, the
process restrictions on the use of PCORI findings and research are
significant, but they are not as onerous as the skeptics claim.
First, the restrictions are limited to decisions within Medicare
coverage, and to a more limited degree to cost control recommendations by
IMAB. The restrictions do not limit the use of PCORI findings for other
government programs and private sector coverage.
Second, the
transparency process, which is much like federal rulemaking, will often
result in a better product if the old adage “more heads are better than one”
has any efficacy. Many regulators have found that stakeholders -- even
those opposed to a proposed regulation -- often come up with better ideas
or find mistakes that the regulators overlooked. When these deficiencies are
identified in the public comment process, regulators have a chance of
correcting them. Even if there are no deficiencies and stakeholders are
adamant in their opposition, the regulator gets the additional advantage of
knowing what issues will be opposed, the arguments for those positions
and the opportunity to develop counter-arguments. A PCORI finding or
evidence that successfully runs the required ACA procedural gauntlet will
only have its legitimacy and credibility enhanced, which will greatly
increase the chances of acceptance by clinicians.
Skeptics also believe that non-clinician stakeholders participating
in PCORI governance will greatly increase the danger of regulatory
capture. For the very same reasons articulated above, the ACA process
mitigates this danger and in fact may reduce the risk of such capture
considerably.
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The third major concern articulated by skeptics relates to the
absence of a mandate for clinicians to accept PCORI findings. Skeptics
point to the historic reticence of clinicians to give up any autonomy and in
particular to give it up to the government. This argument overlooks the fact
that the polestar of PCORI is voluntary acceptance of its findings and/or
evidence. Whether or not clinicians will accept or reject PCORI findings
and/or evidence remains to be seen. Clinicians will certainly prefer the
PCORI process to the restrictions imposed by the insurance industry over
the last 40 years. In addition, odds are that credible PCORI findings and/or
evidence will be accepted by clinicians, especially if PCORI is viewed as
“a trusted source.” Although it has been amply documented (including
through John Wennberg's small practice variations studies175 and initiatives
such as the Dartmouth Atlas of Medicine176) that clinician decision-making
has an aspect of “herd” autonomy -- that is, clinicians, at least to date, have
been influenced more by the professional socialization process, i.e., where
they went to school and what their peers do, than by evidence when making
clinical care decisions – there is growing evidence in recent years that
clinicians are increasingly embracing evidence-based medicine.177
In sum, either because of political necessity, accident or elegant
design, PCORI’s focus on transparency and voluntary adoption by
clinicians appears to be the optimal route to the implementation of CER
and evidence-based medicine for clinicians.
IV.

PROGNOSIS (OR A BETTER TITLE ANYONE?
“PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER.”)

SUCH AS

Despite the bungled rollout of the ACA and resulting public
confusion over the ACA's access options, exchanges, mandates and
subsidies, the ACA has resulted in expanded coverage for some 16.4
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million uninsured178 through the prohibition of pre-existing exclusions,
expanded age participation for dependents on parents’ policies, and
Medicaid expansion in those 29 states plus the District of Columbia that
opted for expansion under the ACA. Now that the “glitches” that
manifested themselves during the rollout are being remedied, more will be
covered not only through the exchange market but also by Medicaid since
one of the functions of the exchanges is to refer Medicaid eligibles to the
government program.
Even so, public opinion regarding the ACA and the President
remains sharply divided and repeal or substantial change is not beyond the
realm of possibility if the Republican Party captures the White House and
both houses of Congress in 2016.
However, any change will not be quite as expected largely because
of benefits from the ACA itself and the societal changes described in
Section I of this Article. Even if those favoring repeal come into
ascendancy, their options will be severely limited due to the millions of
newly covered uninsureds. Even those who were already insured when the
ACA went into effect are weary of change and uncertainty and these
uncertainties and anxiety will force those that advocate change to be very
cautious -- especially as the employer's role diminishes.
Any new changes will create turmoil and shift public opinion from
the existing distrust of ACA's real or perceived coercion regarding the
individual mandate to an environment that underscores the absolute need
for and practicality of having coverage. This need has been embraced by
most of the stakeholders and is of particular importance to institutional
providers and large portions of the individual medical community. While
some elements of the population and clinicians are still holding out, in the
end practicality will trump the historic infatuation with free choice.
The changes that do occur or have the most likelihood of occurring
will be limited to ACA's “free-market” access programs discussed in
Section II. The lasting and enduring legacies of the ACA discussed in
Section III of this Article will remain in place for several reasons.

178
Department of Health and Human Services, Health Insurance Coverage
and
the
Affordable
Care
Act
1
(May
5,
2015),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2015/uninsured_change/ib_uninsured_change.pd
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First and foremost will be the new and expanded political
constituencies favoring direct coverage rather than guaranteed access
accompanied by evidence-based medicine and greater clinical autonomy
that exists today over clinical decisions. For example, between 2014 and
2020, the Medicare population is projected to increase by 21% to 54.8
million beneficiaries179 due to the onset of retirement for the baby boomers.
Over the same period, the Medicaid population is projected to increase by
12%, to 65 million,180 due to the 29 states and the District of Columbia that
have opted into the program and the likelihood that other states will change
their mind and will welcome at least 10 years of fiscal relief from Medicaid
liabilities.181 Many also believe the Medicaid population will increase also
because the gap between the have and have-nots will increase rather than
decrease. Institutional providers and individual clinicians will support this
increase in Medicare and Medicaid participation to ensure cash flow for
their operations.
The medical clinicians will consolidate for the same reasons. The
growth of ACOs will accelerate for similar reasons as well as for another
very important one: the ACO structure leverages clinician power vis-à-vis
other stakeholders and restores to them a fair amount of the autonomy they
had lost to third-party payers over the last 40 years.
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Last but not least, the employer community (both large and small)
is eager to move rapidly away from employers’ traditional role as sponsors
of health plans either by no longer providing such plans, encouraging
employees to move to the exchanges, or shifting to a defined contribution
rather than defined benefit environment. New employers in particular will
be loath to go back to the system of the last 60 years.
All of these constituencies have a similar agenda: 1) shifting actual
or moral responsibility for healthcare plan formation and administration
from the private sector to the government; 2) a belief that healthcare
efficiencies will only be realized through universal participation (a large
diversified group with resulting cross subsidies and uniform procedures);
and 3) a consensus that healthcare efficiencies can be best realized through
“evidence-based medicine” and best practices. This latter consensus is
even embraced by the medical community as long as clinical autonomy is
restored and best practice findings are “voluntary” and considered by
clinicians as emanating from a “trusted source.”
For these reasons the enduring legacies described in Section III of
this Article will remain in place as long as the VBP/CER protocols are
maintained. Diverse participation in decision-making, transparency and
voluntary acceptance are essential to CER being a “trusted source.”
The ACA may also have another benefit though this in my mind is
more of an aspirational than a likely result. Maybe stated a better way is
that these aspirational hopes will be the most difficult to overcome.
The ongoing dialogue regarding the flawed ACA rollout hopefully
will educate the public that the private model is not sustainable, equitable
or workable. Hopefully the dialogue will educate the public that we are all
in this together. Hopefully the young invincibles will realize that the need
for medical care for them is not an option or in the “if” category -- instead
it is just a matter of “when” -- which can happen at any time whether by
sickness or accident.
The ACA debate will also hopefully educate the body politic that
there is no benefit or plan known to man that does not have limits, because
we do not have infinite resources. In addition, life itself has limits and this
may be the most difficult concept for any of us to accept. Hopefully the
ACA will help by giving all of us the grace to accept that fact.

